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A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching
Abstract
We analyze a myopic strategy adjustment process in strategic-form games. It is shown that the steady
states of the continuous time limit, which is constructed assuming frequent play and slow adjustment of
strategies, are exactly the best-reply matching equilibria, as discussed by Droste, Kosfeld, and
Voorneveld (2000. Mimeo, Tilburg University). In a best-reply matching equilibrium every player
?matches' the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this pure strategy is a best
reply to the pure-strategy profile played by his opponents. We derive stability results for the steady
states of the continuous time limit in 2×2 bimatrix games and coordination games. Analyzing the
asymptotic behavior of the stochastic adjustment process in discrete time shows convergence to minimal
curb sets of the game. Moreover, absorbing states of the process correspond to best-reply matching
equilibria of the game.
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Abstract
We analyze a myopic strategy adjustment process in strategic-form games. It is
shown that the steady states of the continuous time limit, which is constructed assuming
frequent play and slow adjustment of strategies, are exactly the best-reply matching
equilibria, as discussed in Droste et al. (2000). In a best-reply matching equilibrium
every player ‘matches’ the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that
this pure strategy is a best reply to the pure strategy profile played by his opponents. We
derive stability results for the steady states of the continuous time limit in 2×2 bimatrix
games and coordination games. Analyzing the asymptotic behavior of the stochastic
adjustment process in discrete time shows convergence to minimal curb sets of the game.
Moreover, absorbing states of the process correspond to best-reply matching equilibria
of the game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we introduce an adjustment process that models the evolution of mixed strate-
gies in finite normal-form games. Two interpretations are available for the adjustment pro-
cess. The first is based on a multipopulation model of social learning, as commonly studied in
evolutionary game theory. In this set-up mixed strategies represent shares of pure strategies
in the populations corresponding to different player positions in the underlying game. The
second interpretation of the process focuses on individual decision-making and is more closely
related to the psychological literature on individual learning. Here, mixed strategies capture
probabilistic choice behavior of individual players.
Independent of the interpretation, we take the best-reply structure of the normal-form
game as the main driving force behind the adjustment process. The idea we pursue is the
following: any time the game is played, pure strategies that are best replies to the realized
strategy profile are reinforced, by increasing the probability they are chosen in the future.
On an individual level this assumption is motivated by the experience of regret in case a
player has not played a best reply to the profile of his opponents (or, similarly, rejoice in case
he has played a best reply). On an aggregate, or social, level the idea is that every time a
constant share of strategies dies and is replaced by new strategies that are best replies to the
observed outcome.
Models of reinforcement learning have attracted much interest recently, e.g. to explain
experimental data (Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998; and Camerer and Ho, 1999),
or for building microfoundations to aggregate dynamics in evolutionary game theory (Bo¨rgers
and Sarin, 1997). While this literature shares many fundamental principles with our model,
we shall emphasize a main difference that we believe to be of crucial importance. Contrary
to most other models the reinforcement of strategies in our set-up is not based on actually
earned payoffs but on the experience of having played a best reply. Since the attribute of
being a best reply is a pure ordinal concept, this consequently leads to an ordinal model of
reinforcement learning.
In the course of analyzing the adjustment process, which is a discrete-time Markov pro-
cess with infinite state space, we find it necessary to distinguish between behavior in finite
time and asymptotic behavior. Assuming frequent interaction and slow adjustment, behav-
ior in finite time can be approximated by a dynamical system of deterministic differential
equations. Frequent interaction and slow adjustment mean that each discrete-time period
contains ‘many’ repetitions of the game, and that the players’ adjustments of their mixed
strategies between two successive repetitions are ‘small’, respectively. The approximation
is based on results from Norman (1972) that recently have also been used in Bo¨rgers and
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Sarin (1997). For a general discussion of approximation of stochastic processes by dynam-
ical systems, including also a stronger approximation result see, e.g., Bena¨ım and Weibull
(1999) and Sandholm (1999).1 In our set-up analyzing the steady states of the deterministic
approximation and their stability properties provides us with information about the players’
behavior in finite time.
A main feature of the deterministic approximation is that its steady states predict match-
ing behavior. In fact, they predict so-called best-reply matching behavior, meaning that every
player plays a pure strategy with a probability which is generically equal to the probability
that this pure strategy is a best reply to the pure-strategy profile of his opponents. Matching
behavior arising in a repeated interaction scenario suggests that a player eventually ‘learns’
the probabilities with which the pure-strategy profiles of his opponents occur. However, once
these probabilities are ‘known’, he does not reply by playing the pure strategy that max-
imizes expected utility but instead matches the probabilities. Matching behavior is often
associated with the decision-theoretic setting where a player repeatedly faces a two-armed
bandit problem. A two-armed bandit is a slot machine with two arms, each operating with
a fixed probability. At each point in time, the player’s task is to predict which arm will be
operating. In such a setting matching behavior is supported by the experiments of, e.g., Ed-
wards (1956), Siegel and Goldstein (1959), and Suppes and Atkinson (1960). In this paper,
we propose a model which predicts that matching behavior may also occur in interactive
situations.
The asymptotic behavior of the stochastic adjustment process can typically be quite
different from the asymptotic behavior of the deterministic approximation. More precisely,
we show that asymptotic behavior of the adjustment process is characterized by a set of
mixed-strategy profiles whose supports are contained in a minimal curb set. Minimal curb
sets are introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991). A nonempty product set of pure strategies
is said to be closed under best replies if all best replies against all these pure strategies are
contained in the set. Minimal sets with this property are called minimal curb sets. Still,
it may happen that asymptotic behavior of the adjustment process and the deterministic
approximation coincide. A necessary condition for this to happen is the existence of an
absorbing state of the adjustment process. Namely, as we will show, the absorbing states of
the adjustment process reflect best-reply matching behavior.
As mentioned above, on the individual level of players the adjustment process is closely
related to the literature on reinforcement learning as pioneered by Estes (1950) and Bush and
Mosteller (1955), see also Cross (1983). Reinforcement learning assumes that players behave
1Contrary to our model, however, these articles consider Markov processes with a finite state space.
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in a stimulus-response fashion where pure strategies are positively or negatively reinforced
through their payoffs. Since these models do not require players to develop complicated cog-
nitive processes in order to form beliefs about their environment, they are very attractive
from the players’ rationality or knowledge point of view. On this point, the adjustment pro-
cess considered in this paper is closely related to the reinforcement learning models. Namely,
we assume players to myopically adjust their mixed strategies in response to the experiences
they have when playing the game. Players negatively reinforce pure strategies which are not
a best reply to the realized outcome of the game. This also indicates the main difference
between the adjustment process and the reinforcement learning models: the adjustment pro-
cess is based on an ordinal concept of best replies, while models of reinforcement learning are
based on cardinal concepts of payoffs.
The learning models analyzed by Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1995, 1997) are of special relevance
to the adjustment process considered in this paper. Not only are the mathematical techniques
used in the work of Bo¨rgers and Sarin to some extent similar to the ones we use here, but also,
under certain conditions Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1995) predict matching behavior in interactive
situations. The learning process analyzed in Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1995) differs, however,
significantly from the present adjustment process as it explicitly models an endogenously
evolving aspiration level.
Hurkens (1995) considers a learning process in finite normal-form games which is repre-
sented by a discrete-time Markov process with a finite state space. The players are assumed
to play best replies against their beliefs, which in turn are formed on the basis of the pure-
strategy profiles used in the recent past. It is shown that the learning process leads the
players to play pure-strategy profiles from a minimal curb set.
The adjustment process is also related to the adaptive procedure of Hart and Mas-Colell
(2000). Although Hart and Mas-Colell focus on a process leading to correlated equilibria,
the intuition underlying their procedure coincides to a certain extent with the regret consid-
erations mentioned above. In fact, they assume that players adjust the probabilities assigned
to pure strategies by measuring the average regret of not having played that strategy in the
past. Notice that we assume players to focus on recent history only. Furthermore, contrary to
the ordinal approach presented in this paper, Hart and Mas-Colell measure regret by actual
payoff differences.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the class of normal-form
games considered in this paper and we state the adjustment process describing how the
players’ behavior evolves over time. Two alternative interpretations of the adjustment process
are discussed in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 deal with behavior in finite time. The main result
in Section 4 identifies the dynamical system which approximates the adjustment process in
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finite time. Section 5 deals with the stability properties of the steady states of the dynamical
system. (We include a further result in the appendix.) The asymptotic long-run behavior of
the adjustment process is analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The finite normal-form game that we consider in this paper is represented by a tuple G =
〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players. Every player i ∈ N
has a finite set Si of pure strategies and a binary relation i over the joint pure-strategy set
S =
∏
i∈N Si, which reflects his preferences over the outcomes of the game G. The binary
relation i is assumed to be reflexive and its asymmetric part i, defined for all s, s˜ ∈ S by
s i s˜⇔ [s i s˜ and s˜ 6i s] ,
is assumed to be acyclic. In the following, we also consider the more stringent case in which
the preference relations i induce von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions ui : S → IR.
The corresponding game is denoted by G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉. We write S−i = ∏j∈N\{i} Sj
for notational convenience. For a pure-strategy tuple s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S and a player
i ∈ N , we let s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) ∈ S−i and, with a slight abuse of notation,
s = (si, s−i) ∈ S.
The set of mixed strategies of a player i ∈ N is denoted by
∆i := {σi : Si → IR | ∀si ∈ Si : σi(si) ≥ 0,
∑
si∈Si
σi(si) = 1}
and the set of mixed strategies of a player i ∈ N , such that a positive probability is assigned
to every pure strategy, is given by
int (∆i) := {σi : Si → IR | ∀si ∈ Si : σi(si) > 0,
∑
si∈Si
σi(si) = 1}.
Analogous to the pure-strategy case, we use notations ∆, ∆−i, σ−i, and σ = (σi, σ−i). Further-
more, for a mixed-strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ and a player i ∈ N , we let σ−i(s−i) := ∏j∈N\{i} σj(sj)
denote the probability that the opponents of player i play the pure-strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i.
Similarly, for a mixed-strategy profile σ ∈ ∆, σ (s) = ∏i∈N σi(si) gives the probability that
the pure-strategy profile s ∈ S is realized.
Finally, for every player i ∈ N and every pure-strategy profile of his opponents s−i ∈ S−i,
we denote the set of best replies, i.e., the set of pure strategies that player i cannot improve
upon, by
Bi(s−i) := {si ∈ Si |6 ∃s˜i ∈ Si : (s˜i, s−i) i (si, s−i)}.
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Since Si is finite and i is acyclic, we know that Bi(s−i) is nonempty. We assume that every
player i ∈ N has knowledge of the set Bi(s−i) for every pure-strategy profile of his opponents
s−i ∈ S−i.
The game G introduced above is played repeatedly by the n players. The iterations of
the game are indexed by k ∈ IN0 := IN ∪ {0}. We take a probabilistic choice approach,
meaning that at each time k ∈ IN0 every player i ∈ N plays a pure strategy si ∈ Si, but
this pure strategy is drawn from the probability distribution over his set of pure strategies
as induced by his mixed strategy σki ∈ ∆i. Hence, at each time k ∈ IN0, every player i ∈ N
is completely characterized by his mixed strategy σki ∈ ∆i. The state of the game, which
characterizes every player i ∈ N , at time k ∈ IN0 is therefore given by a mixed-strategy profile
σk = (σk1 , . . . , σ
k
n) ∈ ∆. By σki (si), we denote the probability that player i, at time k, plays
the pure strategy si ∈ Si. Furthermore, for a mixed-strategy profile σk ∈ ∆ and a player
i ∈ N , we let σk−i(s−i) :=
∏
j∈N\{i} σkj (sj) denote the probability that player i’s opponents,
at time k, play the pure-strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i. Similarly, for a mixed-strategy profile
σk ∈ ∆, σk(s) = ∏i∈N σki (si) gives the probability that the pure-strategy profile s ∈ S is
realized at time k. The initial state of the game σ0 = (σ01, . . . , σ
0
n) ∈ ∆ is exogenously given.
Now, we describe the adjustment rule that specifies how the players’ mixed strategies,
as represented by the state of the game σk ∈ ∆, evolve over time. Consider a fixed period
k ∈ IN0 and let the pure-strategy profile s ∈ S be realized in this period. We assume that
after the game G is played every player i ∈ N observes the realized pure-strategy profile of
his opponents s−i ∈ S−i and then adjusts his mixed strategy as follows
σk+1i (si) =
 (1− θ)σ
k
i (si) +
θ
|Bi(s−i)| if si ∈ Bi(s−i),
(1− θ)σki (si) otherwise,
(1)
where 0 < θ < 1 is exogenously given. For a given initial mixed-strategy profile σ0 ∈ ∆ and
parameter θ, the adjustment rule (1) determines a discrete-time Markov process {σk}k∈IN0
with infinite state space ∆. An extensive discussion of the adjustment rule (1) is contained
in the next section.
3 Two Alternative Interpretations
In this section, we discuss two interpretations of the model, and of the adjustment rule (1)
in particular, as introduced in the previous section. The first interpretation we offer is based
on a multipopulation model of social learning. The second interpretation relies on principles
of individual learning which originated in the psychological literature.
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3.1. A Model of Social Learning
Suppose there exist n large (technically infinite) populations of agents, each corresponding
to a particular player position in the underlying game. Every agent in population i ∈ N is
programmed to a pure strategy si ∈ Si. The fraction of agents in population i programmed
to pure strategy si in period k ∈ IN0 is given by σki (si). We examine the idea that the
multipopulation model describes a process of social learning. In a model of social learning,
agents typically ask around and learn from other agents in the populations. Consider a
social-learning process such that in each period k, some fraction θ of the agents in every
population i ∈ N is randomly drawn to play the game G. The agents who are called to play
the game are randomly matched in n-tuples such that each agent is matched with exactly
one agent from every other population. After all n-tuples of agents have played the game, the
participating agents leave the system and are replaced by new agents who learn something
about the prevailing states of the n populations. More precisely, suppose that the new agents
sample exactly one of the outcomes of the games, say the pure-strategy profiles s ∈ S. Note
that the probability of sampling a pure-strategy profile thus equals its share in the current
populations.
Now, consider a new agent who replaces an agent exiting population i. This new agent
makes a once-and-for-all choice of pure strategy, which he does by adopting the best reply
to the observed pure-strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i. In the case of multiple best replies, we
assume that a new agent adopts each of the best replies with equal probability. Obviously,
the fraction of agents in population i programmed to pure strategy si in period k + 1, i.e.,
σk+1i (si), is then equal to (1− θ)σki (si) + θ|Bi(s−i)| if si ∈ Bi(s−i) and equal to (1− θ)σki (si)
otherwise. This is exactly the adjustment rule (1).
The social-learning model states that agents are being periodically replaced and that only
new agents make choices. This causes the state of the adaptive system, i.e., the distribution
of strategies currently played, to be only a function of last period’s state and not of the entire
history. However, instead of replacing agents, it is also possible to assume that the agents
who are called to play the game (and then adjust their pure strategy) do not remember their
own past experience.
3.2. Principles of Individual Learning
Alternatively, the adjustment rule (1) can be interpreted as a model of individual learning
that is based on common principles from the psychological literature. Adjustment rule (1)
states that a player i ∈ N in period k ∈ IN0, after the game G is played, myopically adjusts
his mixed strategy by first proportionally decreasing all probabilities currently assigned to
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the pure strategies by a fraction 0 < θ < 1. The parameter θ reflects the so-called recency
or forgetting effect, meaning that a player’s recent experience plays a larger role than past
experience in determining his behavior.
Having proportionally decreased all probabilities then leaves the player with a probability
θ that is reallocated over all pure strategies which are best replies to the pure-strategy profile
of his opponents that is realized in period k. Reallocating the probability θ over all best
replies corresponds to the so-called generalization or experimentation effect, stating that
players will not quickly become locked into one alternative in exclusion of all others. The
probability is equally distributed over all best replies, since as far as the recent experience
is concerned no best reply is better than the others. Therefore all alternatives are treated
similarly.
Examination of the psychological literature on individual learning led Roth and Erev
(1995) and Erev and Roth (1998) to the conclusion that the recency effect and the gener-
alization effect are robust phenomena observed in a wide variety of experimental settings.
Both effects should therefore be incorporated in a model studying learning in games.
Note that the pure strategy currently played by player i ∈ N does not directly influence
how he himself adjusts his mixed strategy since the adjustment rule (1) is completely de-
termined by the current pure-strategy profile of his opponents. The pure strategy currently
played by player i does, however, influence the adjustment rule of all of his opponents. Con-
sequently, the pure strategy currently played by player i influences the future mixed-strategy
profiles of his opponents and therefore it will influence his own future behavior indirectly.
According to Erev and Roth, the law of effect is another principle of human learning in
strategic environments. The law of effect, as first introduced by Edward L. Thorndike (cf.
Erev and Roth, 1998, p.859), states that choices which have led to good outcomes in the
past are more likely to be repeated in the future. The adjustment rule (1) reflects the law
of effect even though the rule does not necessarily imply that the probability assigned to a
player’s pure strategy increases if it is a best reply to the realized pure-strategy profile of
his opponents. Indeed, the probability assigned to a best reply may decrease only if this
strategy is one of multiple best replies to the opponents’ strategy profile and if this strategy
currently receives more probability than the alternative best replies. In this case the law of
effect interferes with the generalization effect.
4 Behavior in Finite Time
We find it necessary to distinguish between behavior predicted by the adjustment process
{σk}k∈IN0 in finite time, on the one hand, and asymptotic behavior, on the other hand. This
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and the next section deal with the first kind of behavior.
Before we analyze behavior in finite time it is useful to describe the expected movement
of the state of the game under the adjustment rule (1). Consider the k-th repetition of the
game G and let the current state of the game σk = σ. Given that σk = σ, next period’s state
of the game σk+1 is a random variable. In fact, let E
[
σk+1i (si)− σki (si) | σk = σ
]
denote the
expected value of σk+1i (si)− σki (si) conditional on σk = σ, then it holds that
E
[
σk+1i (si)− σki (si) | σk = σ
]
=
∑
{s−i∈S−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
(
(1− θ)σi (si) + θ|Bi(s−i)| − σi (si)
)
σ−i (s−i)
+ ((1− θ)σi (si)− σi (si))
1− ∑
{s−i∈S−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
σ−i (s−i)

=
∑
{s−i∈S−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
(
θ
|Bi(s−i)| − θσi (si)
)
σ−i (s−i) (2)
−θσi (si)
1− ∑
{s−i∈Si|s−i∈Bi(s−i)}
σ−i (s−i)

= θ
 ∑
{s−i∈S−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i (s−i)
− σi (si)

for all k ∈ IN0, σ ∈ ∆, i ∈ N , and si ∈ Si. As we will see below, the expected movement
(2) of the state of the game is indispensable for describing the behavior of the adjustment
process {σk}k∈IN0 in finite time.
To be able to analyze the behavior of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 in finite time, we
assume that each discrete-time period k ∈ IN0 contains ‘many’ repetitions of the game G,
and that the adjustments of their behavior which the players make between two repetitions
of the game are ‘small’.
Formally, let the time that passes between two repetitions of the game be denoted by
0 < η ≤ 1, which is equivalent to saying that each discrete-time period k contains 1
η
repetitions
of the game. After each repetition of the game, the players adjust their behavior by η times
what is prescribed by the adjustment rule (1), meaning that the players’ adjustment of their
behavior ‘slows down’ at the same rate at which the time distance between two repetitions
shrinks. The above considerations give rise to a slight modification of the adjustment rule
(1). In fact, they lead us to consider the adjustment rule given by
ση,k+1i (si) =
 (1− ηθ)σ
η,k
i (si) +
ηθ
|Bi(s−i)| if si ∈ Bi(s−i),
(1− ηθ)ση,ki (si) otherwise,
(3)
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for all i ∈ N and k ∈ IN0. Again, for a given parameter θ with 0 < θ < 1, we are left with a
discrete-time Markov process {ση,k}k∈IN0 with infinite state space ∆, provided that we specify
the initial random variable ση,0. Since we let the time interval between two repetitions of the
game be equal to η, the random variable ση,k gives the state of the game at ‘real’ time ηk.
We are interested in the limit of the state of the game ση,k as η → 0. As will be
shown below, taking this limit not only enables us to work in continuous time, but also to
approximate the adjustment process {ση,k}k∈IN0 by a linear dynamical system of deterministic
differential equations. To describe the dynamical system, we introduce a function σˆt : IR+ →
∆ which is differentiable with respect to t ∈ IR+. The derivative of σˆt is exactly the expected
movement (2) of the state of the game and is therefore given by
dσˆti (si)
dt
= θ
 ∑
{s−i∈S−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
1
|Bi(s−i)| σˆ
t
−i (s−i)
− σˆti (si)
 (4)
for all t ∈ IR+, i ∈ N , and si ∈ Si. Let σˆ0 denote the initial value of σˆt.
Proposition 1 states that the limit of the state of the game ση,k for any sequence of η’s
and k’s such that η → 0 and kη → t is almost surely given by the state σˆt of the dynamical
system (4) at any finite time t ∈ IR+.
Proposition 1 Suppose that for all 0 < η ≤ 1 it holds that ση,0 = σˆ0 with probability 1.
Consider some t with 0 ≤ t < ∞ and let η → 0 and kη → t. Then ση,k converges in
probability to σˆt.
Proof. To prove Proposition 1, we use Theorem 1.1 in Chapter 8 of Norman (1972). Nor-
man’s theorem is a general central limit theorem for discrete-time Markov processes with
infinite state space, which describe adjustment by small steps. In fact, Proposition 1 follows
directly from parts (A) and (B) of Norman’s theorem and therefore it is sufficient to verify
the conditions imposed by the theorem.
We apply Norman’s theorem to the adjustment process {ση,k}k∈IN0 and we regard ση,k
as an element of [0, 1]Σi∈N |Si| ⊂ IRΣi∈N |Si|. Norman’s condition (a.1) requires that the state
spaces of the processes {ση,k}k∈IN0 approximate the convex hull of these spaces as η goes to
zero. This condition is trivially satisfied because the state space of the adjustment process
{ση,k}k∈IN0 is equal to ∆, which is independent of η. Conditions (a.2) and (a.3) consider the
functions v : IRΣi∈N |Si|× IR→ IRΣi∈N |Si| and w : IRΣi∈N |Si|× IR→ IR(Σi∈N |Si|)×(Σi∈N |Si|), defined
by
v (σ, η) := E
[
ση,k+1 − ση,k
η
∣∣∣∣∣ση,k = σ
]
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and
w (σ, η) := E
(ση,k+1 − ση,k
η
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣ση,k = σ
− E [ ση,k+1 − ση,k
η
∣∣∣∣∣ση,k = σ
]2
= V ar
[
ση,k+1 − ση,k
η
∣∣∣∣∣ση,k = σ
]
.
Here, V ar
[
ση,k+1−ση,k
η
∣∣∣ση,k = σ] denotes the n-dimensional variance-covariance matrix of
the random variable 1
η
(
ση,k+1 − ση,k
)
conditional on the event that the state of the game
ση,k = σ. Similarly to condition (a.1), the conditions require that there exist functions v(·)
and w(·) that approximate v(·, η) and w(·, η) when η is small. Since for our adjustment
process functions v(·, η) and w(·, η) are, again, independent of η, conditions (a.2) and (a.3)
are satisfied, respectively.
Norman’s conditions (b.1), (b.2), and (b.3) require v to be differentiable, the derivative of
v to be bounded, and the derivative of v to be Lipschitz continuous, respectively. Condition
(b.4) states that the function w should be Lipschitz continuous as well. These conditions
hold since the functions v and w are polynomial functions with a compact domain.
Finally, Norman’s condition (c) requires the function r : IRΣi∈N |Si| → IR, defined by
r (σ) := E
∣∣∣∣∣ση,k+1 − ση,kη
∣∣∣∣∣
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣ση,k = σ
 ,
where
|x|3 :=
Σi∈N |Si|∑
l=1
|xl|3
for x ∈ IRΣi∈N |Si|, to be bounded from above. Condition (c) is satisfied because the function
r is a polynomial function with a compact domain as well.
Norman’s theorem ensures that the expectations of the random variables ση,k converge
to the expectation of σˆt as η → 0 and kη → t. Since convergence of expectations implies
convergence in probability this concludes the proof. 2
According to Proposition 1, if η and kη are close to 0 and t, respectively, then, with
large probability, ση,k will be close to σˆt. Thus, frequent play and slow adjustment make it
possible to apply a law of large numbers argument which states that actual adjustment and
expected movement of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 coincide. Consequently, the behavior
predicted by the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 in finite time can to some extent be analyzed
by means of the dynamical system (4).
The first step in an analysis of the dynamical system (4) consists of the identification of the
steady states. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of best-reply matching equilibrium
in finite normal-form games.
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Definition 2 Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 be a game. A mixed-strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ is a
best-reply matching equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N and si ∈ Si it holds that
σi (si) =
∑
{s−i∈S−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i (s−i) . (5)
The set of best-reply matching equilibria of a game G is denoted by BRM (G).
Definition 2 says that in a best-reply matching equilibrium, every player i ∈ N plays a
pure strategy si ∈ Si with a probability which is strongly related to the probability that si
is a best reply to a pure-strategy profile of his opponents. In case the pure strategy si is a
unique best reply, the probability that player i assigns to it equals the probability that si is a
best reply to a pure-strategy profile of player i’s opponents. As becomes clear from expression
(5), this equality no longer holds true in case of multiple best replies. Namely, player i will
then equally distribute the probability that a pure-strategy profile of his opponents is realized
over all best replies to that profile.
Droste et al. (2000) contains an extensive treatment of best-reply matching equilibria,
showing, among other things, that for every finite game G the set of best-reply matching
equilibria BRM (G) is nonempty, and that the set of pure-strategy best-reply matching
equilibria coincides with the set of strict Nash equilibria of a game. Moreover, for two-
player games the dimension of the (compact, convex) set BRM (G) is equal to the number
of minimal curb sets of the game minus one. The new equilibrium notion is furthermore
illustrated by means of several well-known games.
For example, in a 2×2 coordination game like the Battle of the Sexes (see Figure 1), the set
of best-reply matching equilibria can be calculated as BRM (G) = {σ ∈ ∆ | σ1 (A) = σ2 (A)},
meaning that a strategy profile is a best-reply matching equilibrium if and only if both
players play the same mixed strategy. Notice that the two pure strategy best-reply matching
equilibria (A,A) and (B,B) are exactly the strict Nash equilibria of the game. There exists
another Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, which depending on the payoffs of the game
is symmetric or not. If, e.g., a < b, then this Nash equilibrium is not symmetric and hence
not an element of BRM (G). The reason is intuitive. Equalizing expected payoffs over both
pure strategies leads the row-player to put more probability on strategy B than she believes
the other player does. At the same time, the column-player puts more probability on A than
he believes the other player does. This is not in accordance with matching behavior. In a
best-reply matching equilibrium a player wants to do exactly the same as the opponent. If
one chooses A with some probability, the other will choose A with the same probability.
FIGURE 1
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While other games, like Matching Pennies, possess a unique best-reply matching equilib-
rium, in case of a coordination game the set of best-reply matching equilibria is rather large.
This has, of course, an effect on the predictive power of the equilibrium concept. However,
as we will see in Section 6, it is exactly the adjustment process of the present model that
leads to a refinement of the equilibrium based on its asymptotic prediction. For more details
concerning best-reply matching in games we refer to the above mentioned paper.2
Proposition 3 gives a motivation for the concept of best-reply matching equilibrium by
stating that the steady states of the dynamical system (4) are exactly the best-reply matching
equilibria of the underlying normal-form game.
Proposition 3 Consider a game G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉. Then the set of steady states of
the dynamical system (4), which is characterized by ˙ˆσi (si) :=
dσˆti(si)
dt
= 0 for all i ∈ N and
si ∈ Si, coincides with BRM (G), i.e., the set of best-reply matching equilibria of G.
Proof. Proposition 3 follows immediately from comparing the conditions for a steady state
of the dynamical system (4) and Definition 2. 2
We next come to the second step in an analysis of the dynamical system (4), which
consists of a stability analysis of the steady states.
5 Stability Analysis
To establish stability properties of single steady states or sets of steady states of the contin-
uous time limit introduced in Section 4, we use both the eigenvalue analysis of the Jacobian
and the direct Lyapunov method.
The eigenvalue analysis is based on the well-known result that a steady state of a linear
system of differential equations is stable if the real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian,
evaluated at the steady state, are nonpositive and every eigenvalue, which has a zero real
part, has single multiplicity. Furthermore, a steady state is asymptotically stable if and only
if all eigenvalues have negative real parts. Finally, a steady state is unstable if there exists
an eigenvalue of the Jacobian with a positive real part. With respect to the direct Lyapunov
method we use Theorem 6.4 in Weibull (1995).
For general finite normal-form games G it is not possible to derive explicit results with
respect to the stability properties of steady states of the dynamical system (4). For that
reason, we consider 2× 2 bimatrix games and coordination games.3
2Copies can be obtained from the corresponding author (kosfeld@iew.unizh.ch).
3In addition to our results a general convergence result is available for two-player games, showing that
the set of best-reply matching equilibria is globally asymptotically stable for the dynamical system (4). See
appendix.
12
5.1. 2× 2 Bimatrix Games
A 2 × 2 bimatrix game is a two-player normal-form game where the pure-strategy
set of both players consists of two elements. Denoting S1 = {T, B} and S2 =
{L, R}, the dynamical system (4) corresponding to a 2 × 2 bimatrix game becomes
˙ˆσ1 (T) = θ
 ∑
{s2∈S2|T∈B1(s2)}
1
|B1(s2)| σˆ
t
2 (s2)
− σˆt1 (T)

˙ˆσ2 (L) = θ
 ∑
{s1∈S1|L∈B2(s1)}
1
|B2(s1)| σˆ
t
1 (s1)
− σˆt2 (L)
 , (6)
for all t ∈ IR+. The equations for ˙ˆσ1 (B) and ˙ˆσ2 (R) are redundant since σˆt1 (B) = 1− σˆt1 (T)
and σˆt2 (R) = 1 − σˆt2 (L). Let σˆ ∈ ∆ denote a best-reply matching equilibrium of a 2 × 2
bimatrix game, or equivalently a steady state of the dynamical system (6). Proposition 4
gives the stability properties of a best-reply matching equilibrium σˆ ∈ ∆.
Proposition 4 Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 be a 2 × 2 bimatrix game. Then every best-
reply matching equilibrium σˆ ∈ ∆ is Lyapunov stable under the dynamical system (6). If the
game G is not a coordination or a Chicken game, then every best-reply matching equilibrium
is even asymptotically stable.
Proof. To prove Proposition 4, we use the eigenvalue analysis. The Jacobian Jσˆt of the
dynamical system (6) is given by
Jσˆt =
 d ˙ˆσ1(T)dσˆt1(T) d ˙ˆσ1(T)dσˆt2(L)
d ˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
d ˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt2(L)
 =
 −θ d ˙ˆσ1(T)dσˆt2(L)
d ˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
−θ
 .
Consider the entry d
˙ˆσ1(T)
dσˆt2(L)
. Depending on the best-reply structure of the game G this entry
equals −θ, − θ
2
, 0, θ
2
, or θ. To illustrate why this holds, we consider the case where T is the
unique best reply to L and both T and B are best replies to R. For this best-reply structure
it holds that the first equation of the dynamical system (6) equals
˙ˆσ1 (T) = θ
(
σˆt2 (L) +
1
2
σˆt2 (R)− σˆt1 (T)
)
= θ
(
σˆt2 (L) +
1
2
(
1− σˆt2 (L)
)
− σˆt1 (T)
)
.
It follows immediately that in this case the entry d
˙ˆσ1(T)
dσˆt2(L)
= θ
2
. Considering the other eight
possible best-reply structures of a 2×2 bimatrix game then gives the required result. Similarly,
it can easily be shown that the entry d
˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
also equals −θ, − θ
2
, 0, θ
2
, or θ.
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We are left with the actual eigenvalue analysis of the Jacobian Jσˆt . In determining the
eigenvalues we distinguish five cases. First, let either d
˙ˆσ1(T)
dσˆt2(L)
or d
˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
be equal to 0. This
implies that the Jacobian Jσˆt is triangular and that the eigenvalues are therefore given by
the entries on the diagonal, i.e., λ1,2 = −θ < 0. Consequently, a steady state σˆ ∈ ∆ is
asymptotically stable.
Second, let d
˙ˆσ1(T)
dσˆt2(L)
= −θ. In this case the eigenvalues of the Jacobian Jσˆt are given by
λ1,2 = −θ ±
√√√√−θ d ˙ˆσ2 (L)
dσˆt1 (T)
.
When d
˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
= −θ, we find that λ1 = −2θ and λ2 = 0 which implies a steady state σ ∈ ∆ to
be Lyapunov stable, but not asymptotically stable. In all other cases, i.e., d
˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
equal to − θ
2
,
θ
2
, or θ, it holds that Re (λ1,2) < 0, which implies that a steady state σˆ ∈ ∆ is asymptotically
stable.
Third, let d
˙ˆσ1(T)
dσˆt2(L)
= − θ
2
. A straightforward calculation shows that the resulting eigenvalues
equal
λ1,2 = −θ ±
√√√√−θ
2
d ˙ˆσ2 (L)
dσˆt1 (T)
.
Furthermore, it follows immediately that for all possible values of d
˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
it holds that
Re (λ1,2) < 0, i.e., a steady state σˆ ∈ ∆ will be asymptotically stable.
Fourth, let d
˙ˆσ1(T)
dσˆt2(L)
= θ
2
. In this case the eigenvalues are given by
λ1,2 = −θ ±
√√√√θ
2
d ˙ˆσ2 (L)
dσˆt1 (T)
.
Again, this implies that Re (λ1,2) < 0 for all possible values of
d ˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
. Consequently, a steady
state σˆ ∈ ∆ is asymptotically stable.
Finally, let d
˙ˆσ1(T)
dσˆt2(L)
= θ. This gives rise to the following eigenvalues
λ1,2 = −θ ±
√√√√θ d ˙ˆσ2 (L)
dσˆt1 (T)
.
From the above expression it can easily be deduced that Re (λ1,2) < 0 and that a steady
state σˆ ∈ ∆ is asymptotically stable, except when d ˙ˆσ2(L)
dσˆt1(T)
= θ. In the latter case, we find that
λ1 = −2θ and λ2 = 0 which implies a steady state σˆ ∈ ∆ to be Lyapunov stable, but not
asymptotically stable.
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Thus, we find that if either
d ˙ˆσ1 (T)
dσˆt2 (L)
=
d ˙ˆσ2 (L)
dσˆt1 (T)
= θ or
d ˙ˆσ1 (T)
dσˆt2 (L)
=
d ˙ˆσ2 (L)
dσˆt1 (T)
= −θ, (7)
the equilibrium is Lyapunov stable. In all other cases, the equilibrium is even asymptotically
stable. Clearly, condition (7) is equivalent to the game being a coordination game or a
Chicken game, respectively. 2
Proposition 4 determines the stability of a best-reply matching equilibrium in 2 × 2 bi-
matrix games. As shown in the appendix, for general two-player games a further result is
available. In this case, the set of best-reply matching equilibria is globally asymptotically
stable under the dynamical system (4) and each equilibrium is Lyapunov stable.4 This result
reveals a great difference between the dynamics (4) and the standard best-response dynamics,
where players play a myopic best response to the empirical distribution of the opponent’s
play. It is known, for example, that the best-response dynamics need not converge to Nash
equilibrium in games that are of a structure like Shapley’s 3 × 3 game, i.e., where play-
ers use more than two strategies in the mixed Nash equilibrium (Shapley, 1964; Krishna and
Sjo¨stro¨m, 1998). In contrast, the present result implies that also in these games the dynamics
(4) converge to a best-reply matching equilibrium of the game.
For the special case of two-player coordination games we can prove asymptotic stability
of the set of best-reply matching equilibria using the direct Lyapunov method.
5.2. Coordination Games
A two-player game is a coordination game if both players i ∈ N = {1, 2} have the same set
of pure strategies, i.e., S1 = S2 =: X, and the unique best reply to a pure strategy of the
opponent is to play the same pure strategy. In the case of a two-player coordination game
the dynamical system (4) therefore reduces to
˙ˆσi (si) = θ
(
σˆtj (si)− σˆti (si)
)
(8)
for all t ∈ IR+, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i, and si ∈ X. It follows directly from the dynamical
system (8) and Proposition 3 that the set of best-reply matching equilibria BRM (G) of
a two-player coordination game is given by {σˆ ∈ ∆ | σˆ1 (si) = σˆ2 (si) for all si ∈ X}. Using
the direct Lyapunov method, Proposition 5 gives the stability properties of the set of best-
reply matching equilibria and each single best-reply matching equilibrium of a two-player
coordination game.
4Note that in most 2 × 2 bimatrix games Proposition 4 guarantees even asymptotic stability of a single
equilibrium.
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Proposition 5 Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 be a two-player coordination game. Then the
set of best-reply matching equilibria BRM (G) is asymptotically stable under the dynamical
system (8). Furthermore, each single best-reply matching equilibrium σˆ ∈ ∆ is Lyapunov
stable under the dynamical system (8).
Proof. First, consider the set of all steady states of the dynamical system (8), i.e., let
A = {σˆ ∈ ∆ | σˆ1 (si) = σˆ2 (si) for all si ∈ X}. It is easily seen that the set A is closed. Let
the Lyapunov function v : IR|X| × IR|X| → IR+ be given by
v (σˆ) =
1
2
∑
si∈X
(σˆ2 (si)− σˆ1 (si))2 .
Obviously, v (σˆ) is continuously differentiable and v (σˆ) = 0 if and only if σˆ ∈ A. Furthermore,
it holds that ∑
i∈N
∑
si∈X
dv (σˆ)
dσˆi (si)
˙ˆσi (si) = −2θ
∑
si∈X
(σˆ2 (si)− σˆ1 (si))2 < 0
for all σˆ /∈ A. According to the direct Lyapunov method, the set A is asymptotically stable.
Second, let A be the closed and connected set consisting of a single steady state, say
(σ1, σ1) ∈ ∆, of the dynamical system (8), i.e., A = {(σ1, σ1)}. Let the Lyapunov function
v : IR|X| × IR|X| → IR+ be given by
v (σˆ) =
1
2
∑
si∈X
(σˆ1 (si)− σ1 (si))2 + (σˆ2 (si)− σ1 (si))2 .
Again, it is obvious that v (σˆ) is continuously differentiable, v (σˆ) = 0 if and only if σˆ ∈ A,
and ∑
i∈N
∑
si∈X
dv (σˆ)
dσˆi (si)
˙ˆσi (si) = −θ
∑
si∈X
(σˆ2 (si)− σˆ1 (si))2 ≤ 0
for all σˆ /∈ A. Consequently, according to the direct Lyapunov method, each single steady
state of the dynamical system (8) is Lyapunov stable. 2
Notice that the Lyapunov function v as used in the proof of Proposition 5 is not only
properly defined on a small neighborhood of the set of best-reply matching equilibria, but
even on the entire state space ∆. Hence, the set of best-reply matching equilibria is globally
asymptotically stable, meaning that convergence to that set will be observed independent of
the initial state of the dynamical system (8).
Before turning to the stochastic adjustment process again, it is worth mentioning that an
analogous result to Proposition 5 can be proven for the (2× 2) game Chicken. In this case,
the Lyapunov function can be taken as
v (σˆ) =
1
2
∑
si∈{s1,s2}
(1− σˆ2 (si)− σˆ1 (si))2 .
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6 Asymptotic Behavior
This section deals with the asymptotic long-run behavior of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0
as k →∞. We specify asymptotic behavior and thereby show that it may be different from
the behavior in finite time as discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
We closely follow Norman’s (1968, 1972) work on distance-diminishing Markov processes.
To study the asymptotic behavior, we need the following notation. Recall that the adjustment
process {σk}k∈IN0 is a discrete-time Markov process with infinite compact state space ∆. For
σ ∈ ∆ and Borel set A ⊂ ∆ we denote the transition probabilities of the adjustment process
{σk}k∈IN0 in the first period by the stochastic kernel K (σ,A) = Pr(σ1 ∈ A | σ0 = σ).
Analogously, the transition probabilities of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 over the first k
periods are given by the stochastic kernel Kk (σ,A) = Pr(σk ∈ A | σ0 = σ). A stochastic
kernel is a function that is a probability measure in its second variable for each value of its
first, and measurable in its first variable for each value of its second. We let K0 (σ,A) be
equal to 1 if σ ∈ A and 0 otherwise. A sequence {Kk}k∈IN0 of stochastic kernels is said to
converge uniformly to a stochastic kernel K∞ if for each Borel subset A of ∆ and ε > 0,
there exists an integer M such that
K∞ (σ, int(A))− ε ≤ Kk (σ,A) ≤ K∞ (σ, cl(A)) + ε
for all k ≥M and σ ∈ ∆. In the above expression, int(A) and cl(A) denote the interior and
the closure of set A.
The analysis of asymptotic behavior of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 is conducted
through several results and examples. The first proposition shows uniform convergence of a
stochastic kernel that is strongly related to the adjustment process.
Proposition 6 The stochastic kernel 1
k+1
∑k
j=0K
j of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 con-
verges uniformly as k →∞ to a stochastic kernel K∞.
Proof. Theorem 2.1 in Norman (1968) is a convergence result for distance-diminishing
discrete-time Markov processes with infinite state space that implies Proposition 6. It is
therefore sufficient to verify that the conditions (H1)-(H8), which are imposed by Theorem
2.1 in Norman (1968), are satisfied by the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 .
Condition (H1) states that the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 should be a Markov process,
which is obviously satisfied. Condition (H2) requires that Si is finite for all i ∈ N , which by
assumption is true as well. Norman’s condition (H3) requires {σk}k∈IN0 to be memory-less and
temporally homogeneous, meaning that the probabilities of all possible pure-strategy profiles
at time k depend only on the state of the game at time k, i.e., σk, and not on earlier states
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or pure-strategy profiles or even on the number of repetitions of the game. This condition is
clearly satisfied.
Conditions (H4) and (H5) require the state space to be a compact metric space, which are
satisfied because ∆i is a compact subset of IR
|Si|−1 for all i ∈ N . As the function ϕs : ∆→ IR
defined by
ϕs
(
σk
)
:=
N∏
i=1
σki (si)
is differentiable on the state space ∆, condition (H6) only requires the absolute value of each
component of
dϕs(σk)
dσk
to be finite. In fact, it can easily be verified that the absolute value of
each component of
dϕs(σk)
dσk
is an element of [0, 1].
Norman’s condition (H7) requires the following. Consider any time k and let σk and σ˜k
be two possible states of the game at that time. Consider also a fixed pure-strategy profile
s ∈ S. Denote by σk+1 and σ˜k+1 the states of the game that are reached if the preceding
states were σk and σ˜k, respectively, and pure-strategy profile s was realized at time k. (H7)
requires that ∥∥∥σk+1 − σ˜k+1∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥σk − σ˜k∥∥∥ ,
where ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. A straightforward calculation shows that for the
adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 it holds that∥∥∥σk+1 − σ˜k+1∥∥∥ = (1− θ) ∥∥∥σk − σ˜k∥∥∥ .
Since 0 < θ < 1, condition (H7) is clearly satisfied.
Finally, condition (H8) requires the weak inequality
∥∥∥σk+1 − σ˜k+1∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥σk − σ˜k∥∥∥ to be
strict in certain special cases. Since 0 < θ < 1, the inequality is always strict with respect
to the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 . Norman’s condition (H8) is therefore automatically
satisfied. 2
Given an initial state of the game, the stochastic kernel 1
k+1
∑k
j=0K
j specifies for each
Borel subset A of ∆ the average probability of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 being in A
during the first k + 1 periods. Notice that Proposition 6 only asserts convergence of these
average probabilities and is therefore not meant to suggest that there exists a mixed-strategy
profile σ∞ to which σk converges with probability 1 as k → ∞. Though such convergence
may very well occur, it does not occur in general, as we will see below.
To study properties of the stochastic kernel K∞, we need some further notation. Recall
that for every player i ∈ N and each pure-strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i of his opponents, we
denote the set of best replies by
Bi (s−i) = {si ∈ Si |6 ∃s˜i ∈ Si : (s˜i, s−i) i (si, s−i)} .
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Let B (s) =
∏
i∈N Bi (s−i) and for every set C =
∏
i∈N Ci ⊂ S let Bi (C) = ∪s∈CBi (s−i) and
B (C) =
∏
i∈N Bi (C). A nonempty set C ⊂ S is said to be closed under best replies, or
equivalently a curb set, if B (
∏
i∈N Ci) ⊂ C. Curb is short for closed under rational behavior.
A set is curb if all best replies against all these pure strategies are contained in the set.
Such a set C is called a minimal curb set if it does not properly contain a curb set. It is
straightforward to show that B (
∏
i∈N Ci) = C for every minimal curb set. For a game G let
C (G) denote the set of minimal curb sets of that game. Since the joint pure-strategy set S
is always a curb set, every game G has at least one minimal curb set, i.e., C (G) 6= ∅. The
notion of curb set was introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991).
In addition, for every nonempty set Ci ⊂ Si let ∆i (Ci) ⊂ ∆i be the face of the simplex
∆i spanned by Ci, i.e.,
∆i (Ci) = {σi ∈ ∆i | supp (σi) ⊂ Ci} ,
where supp (σi) = {si ∈ Si | σi (si) > 0} is the support of σi ∈ ∆i. Likewise, for every
collection C =
∏
i∈N Ci ⊂ S of nonempty sets Ci ⊂ Si, one for every player i ∈ N , we
let the closed and convex set ∆ (C) be the face of the mixed-strategy set ∆ spanned by C,
i.e., ∆ (C) =
∏
i∈N ∆i (Ci). Finally, for a set of mixed strategies Ai ⊂ ∆i of player i let
supp(Ai) = {si ∈ Si | σi(si) > 0 for some σi ∈ Ai} be the support of Ai. For A = ∏i∈N Ai
with nonempty Ai ⊂ ∆i, let supp(A) = ∏i∈N supp(Ai).
Our next results characterize the relation between curb sets and absorbing sets of the
adjustment process. We then prove absorption of the process in minimal curb sets of the
game (Proposition 9). Finally, we look at absorbing states of the process (Proposition 10
and 11). A Borel set A ⊂ ∆ is an absorbing set of the adjustment process, if for all σ ∈ A
and all k ∈ IN, Kk(σ,A) = 1. An absorbing state is a singleton absorbing set.
Lemma 7 If C is a curb set, ∆(C) is an absorbing set. On the other hand, if A is an
absorbing set, supp(A) is a curb set.
Proof. The first claim of Lemma 7 is obvious as the dynamics of individual strategy adjust-
ment involve best replies only. The second claim is proven by contradiction. Denote C :=
supp(A). Suppose there exists a player i ∈ N with strategy si ∈ Si such that si ∈ Bi(s−i)
for some s−i ∈ C−i and si /∈ Ci. Since s−i receives positive probability in A, because of the
adjustment rule (1) si must receive positive probability, as well. Hence, si ∈ Ci, yielding the
contradiction. 2
Because the full strategy space ∆ is also an absorbing set, we are rather interested in a
subcollection of these sets, i.e., the collection of minimal closed absorbing sets. A Borel set
A ⊂ ∆ is a minimal closed absorbing set, if it is (topologically) closed, absorbing, and does
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not properly contain a closed absorbing subset. The existence of a minimal closed absorbing
set is guaranteed by compactness of the space ∆. This follows from an application of Zorn’s
lemma and is proven, e.g., in Norman (1972, Lemma 4.1, p.52).5 An absorbing state is
obviously a minimal closed absorbing set.
Lemma 8 Let A be a minimal closed absorbing set. Then A ⊂ ∆(C), where C is a minimal
curb set.
Proof. By Lemma 7, supp(A) is a curb set. We have to show that supp(A) is indeed a
minimal curb set, which is proven by contradiction. Suppose there exists a subset D ⊂
supp(A), D 6= supp(A), that is curb. By Lemma 7, ∆(D) is absorbing. Consider ∆(D) ∩ A.
Because the adjustment process is distance-diminishing (conditions (H6) to (H8) in Norman,
1968; see also the proof of Proposition 6), ∆(D) ∩ A cannot be empty. More precisely, let
σ0 ∈ ∆(D) and σ˜0 ∈ A be two initial starting points of play, such that σ0 6= σ˜0 (otherwise
σ0 = σ˜0 ∈ ∆(D) ∩ A), and both σ0(s0) > 0 and σ˜0(s0) > 0 for some outcome s0 ∈ D.
Such an outcome and hence such profiles exist because D ⊂ supp(A). Define σ1 and σ˜1 as
the corresponding adjusted mixed strategy profiles based on the learning rule (1) and the
realization of s0. I.e. for each i ∈ N , σ1i is defined as
σ1i (si) =

(1− θ)σ0i (si) + θ|Bi(s0−i)| if si ∈ Bi(s
0
−i),
(1− θ)σ0i (si) otherwise,
and σ˜1 is defined respectively. Now, iterate this procedure. For every k ∈ IN choose an
outcome sk ∈ D such that σk(sk) > 0 and σ˜k(sk) > 0, and define σk+1 and σ˜k+1 as the
corresponding adjusted mixed strategy profiles after realization of sk. Hence, for every i ∈ N
σk+1i (si) =

(1− θ)σki (si) + θ|Bi(sk−i)| if si ∈ Bi(s
k
−i),
(1− θ)σki (si) otherwise,
and σ˜k+1 is defined respectively. Again, this is possible for every k because D ⊂ supp(A) and
both ∆(D) and A are absorbing. Sequences (σk)k∈IN0 and (σ˜
k)k∈IN0 are two different paths of
play generating the same sequence of outcomes (sk)k∈IN. Because the adjustment process is
distance diminishing it follows that ‖σk − σ˜k‖ → 0 as k → ∞. Since both ∆(D) and A are
closed, the limit points lie in ∆(D) ∩ A. Therefore, ∆(D) ∩ A 6= ∅. As ∆(D) ∩ A is clearly
a closed absorbing set and properly contained in A, A cannot be minimal, which yields the
contradiction. 2
5Norman (1972) uses the terminology of an ergodic kernel to refer to a minimal closed absorbing set.
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To see that faces of minimal curb sets are not necessarily minimal closed absorbing sets
themselves, consider the game represented in Figure 2. The state σ =
((
1
2
, 1
2
)
, (1, 0)
)
is the
unique absorbing state of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 that is associated with that game.
(Cf. Proposition 10, the absorbing state is also the unique best-reply matching equilibrium
of the game.) At the same time {T, B} × {L} is the unique minimal curb set of the game.
FIGURE 2
By compactness the number of minimal closed absorbing sets is at least one. For the class
of so-called compact Markov processes Norman (1972, Section 3.4) shows that the number
is also finite. Moreover, for the same class of processes he proves convergence to the union
of minimal closed absorbing sets. As the adjustment process is shown to be compact we can
apply these results to our case. Denote E = ∪dl=1Al the union of minimal closed absorbing
sets of the adjustment process. Clearly, E is a Borel set. Lemma 8 guarantees that E is
contained in the union of the faces of minimal curb sets. Hence, using Norman’s convergence
result we obtain convergence of play to the minimal curb sets of a game.
Proposition 9 Consider a game G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉. Then for each initial state
σ ∈ ∆ it holds that ∑
C∈C(G)
K∞ (σ,∆(C)) = 1.
Proof. Following Chapter 3 of Norman (1972) a Markov process is compact if it has a
compact metric state space and the corresponding transition operator U , defined by
Uf(σ) =
∫
∆
K(σ, dσ˜)f(σ˜),
is a so-called Doeblin-Fortet operator on the space of real-valued bounded Lipschitz functions
on ∆. The latter condition puts some bound on U as well as on the powers Uk that correspond
to subsequent periods of the process controlled by kernels Kk, k ≥ 1 (cf. Definition 1.2,
Norman, 1972, p.35). In particular, Theorem 1.2 in Chapter 2 of Norman (1972) shows
that the transition operator of any distance diminishing Markov process is a Doeblin-Fortet
operator. Hence, the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 is compact.
Theorem 4.1 and 4.2 in Section 3.4 of Norman (1972) show that the following holds for
a compact Markov process. To every minimal closed absorbing set Al (l = 1, . . . , d) there
exists a unique distribution µl that has Al as its support, i.e., Al is the smallest closed set
with µl(Al) = 1. Each of these distributions is stationary, i.e.,∫
∆
µl(dσ)K(σ,B) = µl(B)
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for any Borel set B. Moreover, for all σ ∈ ∆ and Borel sets B
K∞ (σ,B) =
d∑
l=1
gl(σ)µl(B), (9)
where the gl are functions on ∆ which satisfy
d∑
l=1
gl(σ) = 1 (10)
for all σ ∈ ∆. For Borel set E = ∪dl=1Al, (9) and (10) imply that K∞(σ,E) = 1. Using
Lemma 8 from above the proposition follows,
∑
C∈C(G)
K∞ (σ,∆(C)) ≥ K∞
σ, ⋃
C∈C(G)
∆(C)
 ≥ K∞ (σ,E) = 1.
2
Together with Proposition 6, Proposition 9 implies that play according to the adjustment
process is asymptotically absorbed in a minimal curb set. In case the game has several
minimal curb sets, Proposition 9 typically does not specify which curb set will characterize
asymptotic behavior. In fact, if σ ∈ int (∆), then every face ∆ (C), with C ∈ C(G), has a
positive probability of characterizing asymptotic behavior. This follows, e.g., from applying
the analysis in Section 7.2 of Bush and Mosteller (1955) (or similarly the results in Section
3.4 in Norman, 1972) to the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 .
The next proposition describes the absorbing states of the adjustment process.
Proposition 10 Consider a game G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉. Then every pure-strategy best-
reply matching equilibrium of G is an absorbing state of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0.
Furthermore, every absorbing state of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 is a best-reply match-
ing equilibrium, but possibly not in pure strategies.
Proof. As a pure-strategy best-reply matching equilibrium is a singleton minimal curb set
the first statement follows from Lemma 7. To prove the second claim, suppose that σ is an
absorbing state. Then for i ∈ N, si ∈ Si either
σi(si) = (1− θ)σi(si) + θ|Bi(s−i)| (11)
for some s−i ∈ S−i, or
σi(si) = (1− θ)σi(si). (12)
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Equation (12) implies that σi(si) = 0. Equation (11), which can arise only if σi(si) > 0,
implies that
σi(si) =
1
|Bi(s−i)| (13)
for each s−i that is played with positive probability. Thus, an absorbing state is where every
player always plays a best-reply, and in case of multiple best-replies each action receives
the same weight. If best replies are unique, σ is a best-reply matching equilibrium in pure
strategies. If σ is an absorbing state that puts positive probability on more than one action
for at least one player i ∈ N , it still holds for every player i ∈ N and si ∈ Si that
σi(si) =
1
|Bi(s−i)| for all s−i such that σ−i(s−i) > 0.
Hence,
σi(si) =
1
|Bi(s−i)|
∑
{s−i|σ−i(s−i)>0}
σ−i(s−i)
=
∑
{s−i|σ−i(s−i)>0}
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i),
where the last equality follows from the fact that the number of best replies must be the
same for each profile s−i, since σ is an absorbing state and therefore (13) is true. As only
best replies are played in an absorbing state it follows that
{s−i|σ−i(s−i) > 0} = {s−i|si ∈ Bi(s−i)}
and therefore the right-hand side of the last equation is equal to
∑
{s−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i),
which means that σ is a best-reply matching equilibrium. This concludes the proof. 2
Proposition 11 Consider a game G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉. Then for every C ∈ C (G) it
holds that ∆(C) ⊂ ∆ contains a best-reply matching equilibrium.
Proof. For every i ∈ N , si ∈ Si, and σ−i ∈ ∆−i, we define
ri (si, σ−i) :=
∑
{s−i∈S−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i (s−i) ,
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where the empty sum is zero by definition. Now let i ∈ N and σ ∈ ∆(C). Notice that
∑
si∈Ci
ri(si, σ−i) =
∑
si∈Ci
∑
{s−i∈C−i|si∈Bi(s−i)}
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i)
=
∑
s−i∈C−i
∑
si∈Bi(s−i)
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i)
=
∑
s−i∈C−i
σ−i(s−i)
= 1.
Consequently, the mapping
r : ∆ (C)→ ∆(C)
σ 7→ r(σ)
with r(σ)i(si) = ri(si, σ−i) is well-defined. In the definition of the function ri neither the index
set in the summation sign nor the number |Bi(s−i)| of best replies depends on the mixed-
strategy profile σ. Hence, this mapping is obviously continuous. Application of Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem yields the existence of a strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(C) such that σ = r(σ),
which is a best-reply matching equilibrium. 2
Remark. For two-player games it is possible to show that the face of a minimal curb set
contains a unique best-reply matching equilibrium. Consider the function r defined in the
proof of Proposition 11. In the case of a two-player game this function is linear and can be
written in the following form.6 For si ∈ S1 and sj ∈ S2,
r(σ)1(si) =
∑
j
aijσ2(sj)
r(σ)2(sj) =
∑
i
bjiσ1(si),
where aij = 1 if si is the unique best reply of player one to strategy sj of player two, aij =
1
k
if si is one of k different best replies to sj, and aij = 0 if si is not a best reply to sj. bji is
defined respectively. Regarding σ as an element of IR|S1|+|S2|, r can be written in the following
matrix notation:  0 A
B 0
 =: Φ (14)
with A = (aij) and B = (bji). A best-reply matching equilibrium is a fixed point of Φ, i.e. a
vector σ ∈ IR|S1|+|S2| such that Φσ = σ. Now, uniqueness follows directly from the theory of
finite Markov chains. Because the transposed matrix ΦT is a stochastic matrix, i.e. its rows
6Note the close relation to Josef Hofbauer’s proof in the appendix.
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sum up to 1, a best-reply matching equilibrium is in fact an invariant distribution for the
stochastic matrix ΦT . Such a distribution exists and is unique, whenever the matrix ΦT is
irreducible, i.e. all states communicate with each other, or, in other words, the full state space
is the unique communicating class. In our setting states correspond to the pure strategies of
the players and two states communicate with each other if and only if there exists a sequence
of best replies that connects one strategy with the other. Hence, a communicating class is a
curb set and the matrix is irreducible if and only if the full state space is a minimal curb set.
The result indicates a close relation between the number of minimal curb sets of a game
and the set of best-reply matching equilibria. Indeed, for two-player games it follows imme-
diately that the dimension of the set of best-reply matching equilibria is equal to the number
of minimal curb sets minus one (cf. Droste et al., 2000).
We have seen that absorbing states correspond to best-reply matching equilibria which are
contained in the faces of the minimal curb sets. However, it may very well be that the face of a
minimal curb set does not contain an absorbing state at all. Consider, e.g., the game Matching
Pennies as represented in Figure 3. The unique curb set and therefore also the unique
minimal curb set of the game is given by the joint pure-strategy set S = {H, T} × {H, T}.
Due to the presence of the best-reply cycle an absorbing state of the adjustment process
{σk}k∈IN0 does not exist. As a result, the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 never settles down,
i.e., σk does not converge to a mixed-strategy profile σ∞ as k → ∞. Since the unique and
asymptotically stable best-reply matching equilibrium of the Matching Pennies game is given
by σ =
((
1
2
, 1
2
)
,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
, the game also indicates that asymptotic behavior of the deterministic
approximation (equation (4)) and asymptotic behavior of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0
may be different.
FIGURE 3
If, on the other hand, a minimal curb set C contains an absorbing state σ the adjustment
process will converge to that state once it converges to the set C. An example for such a
situation is the game given in Figure 2 with σ being equal to
((
1
2
, 1
2
)
, (1, 0)
)
and C equal to
{T, B} × {L}.
We conclude this section with the coordination game in Figure 4, which belongs to the
class of coordination games discussed in Section 5.2. The game has two strict Nash equilibria,
in which both players play the unique best reply to the opponent’s pure strategy, (A, A) and
(B, B). It is easy to see that both strict Nash equilibria are minimal curb sets and that
there are no other ones. Hence, Proposition 9 implies that play converges to one of the strict
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Nash equilibria with probability one. Note that both Nash equilibria are absorbing states
of the adjustment process and pure-strategy best-reply matching equilibria of the game (cf.
Proposition 10).
FIGURE 4
The coordination game shows again that asymptotic behavior of the deterministic ap-
proximation and asymptotic behavior of the adjustment process {σk}k∈IN0 may differ. To
illustrate this point, consider a mixed-strategy profile that is close to the mixed-strategy
best-reply matching equilibrium σ =
((
1
2
, 1
2
) (
1
2
, 1
2
))
. Due to the stability properties of the
deterministic approximation, as discussed in Section 5.2, that mixed-strategy profile will stay
close to
((
1
2
, 1
2
) (
1
2
, 1
2
))
under the dynamical system (8). In particular, it will stay in the in-
terior of the state space in finite time. As shown above, however, asymptotic behavior of the
stochastic adjustment process is characterized by one of the two strict Nash equilibria that
lie on the boundary of the state space.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed a myopic adjustment process that is based on a particular form of rein-
forcement learning where the value of a pure strategy to be reinforced depends on the fact of
being a best-reply to the experienced outcome of the game. The adjustment process differs
from other learning processes in the sense that no explicit belief formation takes place and
that mixed strategies are not a result of any optimization procedure. Optimization takes
place only on the level of pure strategies, as best replies are the alternatives players focus on.
Mixed strategies are then formed by reinforcement of valuable pure strategies. Our results
show that the adjustment of strategies leads to best-reply matching behavior, both in finite
time and, if play settles down, also in the asymptotic limit of the process. The notion of
best-reply matching has been introduced by Droste et al. (2000) to model boundedly ratio-
nal decision-making in non-cooperative games. Best-reply matching does not conflict with
rational behavior per se. In particular, if players use pure strategies then best-reply matching
equilibrium coincides with strict Nash equilibrium. If strategies are mixed then best-reply
matching implies in general non-rational behavior. We show that for 2×2 bimatrix games all
best-reply matching equilibria are Lyapunov stable steady states of the deterministic version
of the adjustment process, and for a large subclass of these games they are also asymptotically
stable. In general two-player coordination games the set of equilibria is globally asymptot-
ically stable. These results are obtained by approximating the original stochastic process
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by a dynamical system of deterministic differential equations. In the asymptotic limit the
stochastic process concentrates on the minimal curb sets of the game. Moreover, absorbing
states are best-reply matching equilibria, each being contained in the face of a minimal curb
set. Overall we find strong support for the new equilibrium concept.
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Appendix
The following result is due to Josef Hofbauer, University of Vienna. We give his original
proof, adjusted to our notation.
Proposition 12 For 2 person games, the set of best-reply matching equilibria is globally
asymptotically stable for the adjustment process (4).
Proof. For two person games the differential equation (4) is linear and can be written in the
form
˙ˆσ1(si) =
∑
j
aijσˆ2(sj)− σˆ1(si)
˙ˆσ2(sj) =
∑
i
bjiσˆ1(si)− σˆ2(sj). (15)
[We take the liberty to omit the common factor θ > 0.]
Here aij = 1 if si is the first player’s unique best response to strategy sj of the second
player, aij =
1
k
if si is one of k different pure best responses to sj, and aij = 0 if si is not a
best response to sj. Similarly for B = (bji). The matrix 0 A
B 0

is a stochastic matrix: Its entries are nonnegative and its columns sum up to 1. Hence, by
the Perron-Frobenius theorem all its eigenvalues are contained in the unit disk. The matrix
corresponding to the above linear differential equation (15) reads −I A
B −I
 .
Its eigenvalues are obtained by shifting those of the above stochastic matrix by one unit to
the left. Therefore they are contained in the disk with center −1 and radius 1. So they
are either zero or have negative real part. Since the solutions of (15) starting in ∆ are
bounded, the theory of linear differential equations tells us that each solution in ∆ converges
to an equilibrium, the set of equilibria is globally asymptotically stable for (15), and each
equilibrium is Lyapunov stable. 2
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A B
A a, b 0, 0
B 0, 0 b, a
Figure 1: Battle of the Sexes
L R
T 1, 1 1, 0
B 1, 1 0, 0
Figure 2: A game
H T
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
Figure 3: The Matching Pennies game
A B
A 2, 2 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 4: A coordination game
